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Abstract 
The aim of this study is to investigate the relationship between dividend payout ratio in Malaysian firms with 
profitability, size, growth opportunities, free cash flow, business risk and market to book value. The paper used a 
sample of 284 firms listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) from seven sectors viz., Consumer 
Products, Industrial Products, Construction, Finance, Technology, Properties, and Telecommunication. In order 
to decipher the relationships as stated above, multivariate regression analysis is used to test the hypotheses. The 
study found that at the pooled data level for All sectors, free cash flow, return on assets, return on equity, earning 
per share, market to book value and market capitalization have significant positive correlation with dividend 
payout ratio. The variable Beta, however, has a strong negative correlation with dividend payout ratio. The 
findings however differ from sector to sector; results reflect that Market capitalization; Beta, ROA and ROE are 
the common variables which have influence on DPR across various sectors except in technology sector where as 
the variable Market capitalization is not significantly associated with DPR. Similarly, ROA, which is significant 
determinant variable of DPR in four sectors like Construction, Consumer Products, Properties and 
Telecommunication Sector, it has no influence on the dividend payout ratio of the companies in the Industrial, 
Technology and Finance sectors. 
Keywords: dividend payout ratio, profitability, size, growth opportunities, free cash flow, business risk, market 
to book value, market capitalization, Beta. 
 
1. Introduction 
Since early days of the development of the theory of corporate finance, dividend payout decision of the corporate 
sector has been a subject of debate in the literature. Role of agency cost, taxation, and transaction cost etc. on 
dividend decisions continue to draw the attention of researchers. Many models were developed by researchers 
across the globe to identify factors that drives dividend decisions by companies; findings of these studies varied 
widely from country to country. Identification of driver variables of dividend payout ratio in an emerging market 
like Malaysia is more challenging. Ling, et al (2008) defines dividend payout as distributions of retained 
earnings to the investors “Shareholders” based on their proportionate ownership. Dividends are usually paid in 
cash, but sometimes paid in stock or other means. Firms always look for an optimal dividend policy, among 
others to reach equilibrium among current dividend, future growth, and maximize firm’s stock price. Miller and 
Modigliani, in their seminal paper in 1961, developed the dividend irrelevance hypotheses and argued that given 
perfect capital markets, the dividend decision does not affect the firm value. In real life, it has been realized that 
dividend policy does appear to matter in valuation of firms. Several theories have been advanced by economists 
to elucidate why Dividend decision does matter in practice. The Clientele effect theory asserts that the investors 
or the "clienteles" prefer a specific dividend yield; investors who are in high income tax brackets could find it 
more beneficial to hold low dividend yield stocks, whilst those have lower income tax brackets inclined to have 
high dividend yield stocks (Kalay A.1982), (Allen et al. 2003). 
Signaling Hypothesis argue that as the management of the company have more precise information 
about the company than the outsiders, they can bridge this information gap by using dividend payout as a tool to 
convey internal information to the investors (Bhattacharya, 1979), (Miller and Rock, 1985).  
The Agency theory argues that agency cost arises due to conflicts of interest between shareholders and 
management: Payment of dividend, therefore, can decrease the costs of investors and managers conflict (Jensen, 
et al. 1976, Easterbrook, 1984). Agency cost may also arise due to the conflict of interest between the 
stockholders and bondholders; typically, bondholders would like to leave as much free cash as possible in the 
firm by putting in place debt covenant so that this cash would be available to pay bondholders during the time of 
financial distress where as shareholders would like to have this cash for themselves. Easterbrook (1984) 
identified two agency costs viz., the cost of monitoring managers and the cost of risk aversion of the managers. 
In their recent studies Al-Najjar and Hussainey (2009) found that the conflict of interest between managers and 
investors may be reduced by paying dividends to shareholders. Also, Jiraporn et al. (2008) cited that one of the 
core theories clearing up the Dividend policy is the agency problem theory. Jirapron (2004) explored agency 
costs as a determinant of dividend policy especially in the context of shareholders’ rights. Their evidence 
revealed that there is an inverse association between dividend payouts and shareholder rights and they argued 
that firms where shareholders’ rights are more suppressed pay dividends more generously than do firms with 
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strong shareholder rights. 
Bird-in-hand theory posits that due to uncertainty, the investors prefer the cash on hand rather than 
capital gains in the future. It is argued that the uncertainty of dividends payout increases with the time in the 
future (Gordon, 1963). This proposition has however been criticized and there is no strong evidence to support 
the contention. 
As mentioned earlier, the pattern of dividend policy is varies from country to country, particularly 
between developed and emerging markets. Glen et al. (1995) study revealed that emerging markets have 
different dividends policies from the developed markets in countries. Their results show that the dividends 
payout ratio in the emerging markets is approximate two thirds that of developed markets. In recent studies, 
Aivazian et al. (2003) compared between the firms in developing countries and US firms they found that firms in 
emerging markets pay more dividends than the similar firms in US. 
  
2. Previous Research 
2.1 Dividend Policy Theories 
2.1.1  Modigliani & Miller Theory   
In 1961, Merton Miller and Franco Modigiliani (M&M) won the Noble Prize for their Dividend Irrelevance 
Hypothesis which proposed that under certain specific assumptions, a firms’ dividend policy has no influence on 
its value. The basic assumptions behind the irrelevance proposition were that investors are rational, the market is 
efficient, there are no taxes, no cost of bankruptcy, no agency cost and availability of symmetric information. 
One of the major implications of the proposition is that a firm’s investment policy is independent of the dividend 
policy.  
According to Harry DeAngelo & Linda DeAngelo (2006), who revisited the MM theory, argued that as 
“MM’s assumptions restrict payouts to an optimum, their irrelevance theorem does not provide the appropriate 
prescription for managerial behavior ”. According to them, “in an idealized world, managers need to do two 
things to make their stockholders as well off as possible:(1) Select an investment program with maximum 
attainable NPV, and (2) Distribute to investors the full PV of the FCF generated by investment policy over the 
life of the enterprise”. 
2.1.2 Clientele Effect  
According to Kalay (1982), investors ("clienteles") prefer a specific dividend yield; investors who are in the high 
income tax brackets would find it more beneficial to hold low dividend yield stocks, whilst those are in the lower 
income tax brackets inclined to have high dividend yield stocks. 
Allen and Michaely (2003) pointed  out that individual investors are in general higher marginal tax 
bracket  while the corporate investors are in the lower tax bracket;  they then  have illustrated that individual 
investors hold low-dividend paying, whilst the corporate investors have high dividend paying stocks. Jun et al. 
(2006) examined a sample of Australian institutional equity funds and concluded that Australian firms are not 
inclined to pay high dividend. 
2.1.3 Signaling Theory  
Unlike the assumption of symmetric information in the M&M proposition, it is argued that management of the 
firm has more precise information about the future investment decisions, future earnings and profitability of the 
firm than outside investors. Therefore managers can decide the level of dividend payout to convey this internal 
information to the inventors. Managers can therefore decide the level of dividend payout to convey this internal 
information to the inventors. (Bhattacharya,1979), (Ji-ming et al. 2009). 
The asymmetric information model suggests that announcement of dividend payout, which is different 
from the expectations of the investors, contain information on future earnings. Furthermore, stock prices will 
adjust to reflect the unexpected changes of dividend. (Bhattacharya, 1979) (Allen et al. 2000). Benartzi (1997) 
argued that “many dividend theories imply that changes in dividends have information content about the future 
earnings of the firm”. He investigated this implication and found only limited support for it. They also found that 
the size of the dividend increase does not predict future earnings. However, consistent with Lintner's model on 
dividend policy, the author found that “firms that increase dividends are less likely than non changing firms to 
experience a drop in future earnings. Thus, their increase in concurrent earnings can be said to be somewhat 
permanent In spite of the lack of future earnings growth, firms that increase dividends have significant (though 
modest) positive excess returns for the following three years. 
2.1.4     Bird in the Hand Theory  
The theory was developed by Gordon (1963) and it is argued that due to uncertainty, investors prefer the 
certainty of cash on hand rather than capital gains in the future. Under the bird-in-hand theory, stocks with high 
dividend payouts are sought after by the investors and consequently command a higher market price; this is due 
to the fact that dividend has certainty or less risk, the investors will therefore discount dividend of the firm at a 
lower rate of return and hence higher will be the valuation of the firm. Miller and Modigliani (1961) argued that 
high dividend payout do not necessarily increase the firm’s value and reduce the riskiness of the firm. M&M and 
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Bhattacharya (1979) called this argument the bird-in-the-hand fallacy. Furthermore, Bhattacharya (1979) argued 
that the riskiness of firm affects the level of dividend payout. Moreover, the riskiness of a firm’s cash flow 
effects on its dividend payments, but increases in dividend will not decline the risk of the firm. 
2.1.5 Agency Cost Theory 
Agency theory is one the most vital theories in dividend policy. Jensen and Meckling (1976) define the agency 
relationship as “a contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) 
to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent.” 
The core of the agency cost theory is the conflict of interest of the managers and shareholders. The concern of 
the investors is to ensure that their funds are not expropriated or wasted by the managers on unsuccessful 
projects. (Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1997) Easterbrook (1984) suggested that the agency cost 
problem more dividend payout reduces the agency cost by decreasing the risk perception of the investors about 
the tendency of the managers to act in their own interest. Al-Najjar and Hussainey (2009) found that the conflict 
of interest between managers and investors may be reduced by paying dividends to shareholders.  
 
2.2 Related Empirical Studies 
2.2.1 Profitability 
Profitability has long been considered as the most determinants of a firm's ability to pay dividends. Linter, (1956) 
and H. Kent Baker & Gary E. Powell, (2000) pointed out that the dividend payment pattern of a firm is affected 
by the current earnings and past dividends. 
Ling et al. (2008) studied the prfitablity as a funiction of dividend payout ratio in Malaysia and used 
sample consist of 100 firms are listed in Bursa Malaysia, he used return on assets and return on equity as 
parameters. He pointed that ROE and ROA have strong relationship with dividend payout ratio. Jensen et al. 
(1992), Kowalewski et al. (2007) and Guizani & Mondher (2012) found that there is a positive association 
between return on assets (ROA) and dividend payouts, moreover firms that generate more earnings on their 
assets with having important cash flow, consequently pay higher dividend. AL-Kuwari (2010) stated government 
ownership and profitability of firms raise the possibility of paying dividends. Li Ji-ming et al. (2009) found that 
there is strong relationship between Dividend payout and return on equity and earning per share, additionally 
more paying dividends boost the firm’s performance and thus increase of profit.  
DeAngelo et al. (2004) indicates that the increasing dividend concentration may lead to increasing 
earnings concentration. Moreover, they found that in 2000 approximately half of the industrial firms recorded 
losses and just a few of them paid dividends. Earnings in both 1978 and 2000 of the sample firms are 
concentrated among a comparatively few firms at the top end of the distribution, and that such concentration is 
markedly bigger in 2000 than it was in 1978. There was also significant relationship between losses and the 
breakdown to pay dividends. 
Mohamed et al. (2012) used a sample of 200 companies that are listed on Malaysian stock market from 
2003-2005. They found that earning per share and return on equity are significant indictors for profitability 
whether they are used jointly or independently. Aivazian et al. (2003) concluded that in U.S. firms and 
promising market firms, profitability affects dividend payout, high debt ratios lead to reduced dividend payments, 
and market-to-book ratio has a positive relationship with dividend payments. 
Annuar et al. (1993) studied dividend and earnings behavior for 60 firms listed in KLCE. The study 
covers the period from 1975 to 1989. They found that the dividend payout of the firms rely on their current 
earnings and previous dividends, furthermore, increasing earnings leads to raise dividend payment and vice versa. 
Al-Malkawi (2007) studied the determinants of dividend payout in Jordan for all public firms for period 1989-
2000 and he found that the profitability in Jordan considers as one of factors that determine the dividend decision. 
Chigozie (2010) concluded that earning per share and current ratio are the most factors that effect on the 
dividend policy in Nigerian firms. Adil et al. (2011) found that the profitability which is measured by return on 
equity and earning per share has strong relationship with dividend yield. Naceur et al. (2006) studied the 
dividend policy of 48 firms listed on the Tunisian Stock Exchange during 1996-2002. The findings indicate that 
high profitability firms with more stable earnings could gain larger free cash flows and thus pay out larger 
dividends, and fast-growing firms payout larger dividends so as to appeal to investors. 
2.2.2 Firm Size  
Juhmani (2009) studied sample consist of 35 Bahraini companies listed in Bahrain Stock Exchange from 2006-
2007, he used descriptive and statistical analysis. He revealed that dividend payout has significant relationship 
with size of Bahraini companies, profitability and change in previous year dividends listed in Bahrain Stock 
Exchange. Eriotis (2005) investigated the effects of distributed earnings and size of the firms to its dividend 
decision of Greek firms. The author elucidated the Greek firms set their dividends policies not only by net 
distributed earnings, but also by change in dividends, the change ast year earnings and size of the firm.  
The findings suggest that distributed earnings and size of firms included as a signal about the firm’s 
dividend. The Greek firms also having the long term dividend payout ratio. He used the two variables for 
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determines the corporate dividend payout decisions, distributed earnings and size of the firm. The panel 
regression (Cross Section weights) were done and the results of the model give the significant estimations with 
the explanatory power (R2) 95.4%. The evidence of the model suggest that dividend at time (t) can be expressed 
as the long run target Dividend payout represented by the both changes in dividend and in distributed earnings 
and its speed of adjustment towards distributed earnings and the last year dividend of the firm at (t).  
The study concluded that Greek firms distribute divided each year according to their target payout ratio, 
which is dependent on firm size. Holder et al. (1998) found that dividend payout is positively associated with 
firm size. And larger firms have better access to capital markets and find it easier to raise funds at lower costs, 
allowing them to have higher dividend payout. Ho (2003) argued that big companies are more able to pay 
dividends, rather than smaller companies. Baskin (1989) revealed that operating earnings, firm’s size; leverage, 
dividend payout ratio and growth have affect on stock prices. The vital factors that influence on dividend 
decision are the level of current and expected future earnings, size of the firm, stability of earnings, and the 
pattern of past dividends. Imran (2011) studied 36 firms are listed under Pakistan’s engineering sector between 
1996-2008, he found that previous dividend payout yield, earning per share, profitability, sales growth and the 
size of the firm are the most crucial determinants of dividend payout. 
Al Shabibi et al. (2011) studied sample of non-financial firms in UK, they found that board 
independence, profitability, firm size and firm risk have significant relationship with the dividend policy 
decisions in the UK. Moreover, the firm characteristics variables namely, profitability, risk and firm size 
consider as determinant factors for dividend policy among the non-financial UK firms. Osman et al. (2010) 
found the most factors have influence on dividend decision in Saudi Arabia they are namely, profitability, size, 
and business risk. Government ownership, leverage, and age have significant impact on the dividend policy of 
non-financial firms.  
2.2.3 Growth Opportunities   
Al-Najjar & Hussainey (2009) define The Growth is the ability of the firm to remain at the same level of 
development at a certain rate which is likely to be higher than the growth rate compared with other firms. 
Higgins (1972) illustrated that dividend policy is associated negatively with firms need top fund finance growth 
opportunities. Rozeff (1982), Lloyd et al. (1985), Collins et al. (1996), and Amidu and Abor (2006) found that 
historical sales growth and dividend payout are related significantly and negatively. Ho (2003) that the firms 
have high chance for growth are probable spend more on new projects for expansion purposes. As a result, 
dividend paid to the shareholders would be less. La Porta et al. (2000) explored countries with high legal 
protection and found that fast-growth firms paid lower payout, as the shareholders were legally protected, 
allowing them to wait to receive their dividends when the investment opportunities were good. On the other hand, 
in countries with low legal protection for shareholders, firms kept the dividend payout high, to develop and 
maintain a strong reputation, even when they had better investment opportunities. Gill et al. (2010) investigated 
500 financial annual reports announced by public firms in 2007 in USA. They found that a growth related to 
payouts negatively in the entire sample. 
While, Imran (2011) found that dividend per share is associated positively with sales growth. Also 
D`Souza (1999) concluded that a positive relationship but insignificant in the case of growth and negative but 
insignificant relationship in case of market to book value. 
2.2.4 The Free Cash Flow 
Jensen (1986) defined free cash flow as the excess cash flow that’s required to fund all projects with a positive 
net present value (NPV). He illustrated that increasing of free cash flow; it leads to raise agency conflict between 
the interests of insiders and outsiders, then it declines the performance of the company. While shareholders 
desire maximum value of shares, the insiders are inclined to their interests. Jensen (1986), Holder et al.(1998) 
and La Porta et al. (2000) suggested that firms have a greater “free cash flow” could pay more dividends in term 
of reducing the agency costs of free cash flow. Guizani et al. (2012) examined sample of 44 firms in Tunisia 
from 1998-2007, they concluded that free cash flow and profitability impact on Tunisian firm’s dividend 
decisions, they pay higher payouts when they have significant free cash flow and have high profitability. As 
supported by Kowalewski et al. (2007) and Adjaoud et al. (2010).  
2.2.5 Beta “Business Risk”  
It defined as the risk associated to situations in which the company is involved in the risk environment. The 
relationship of firm’s risk and dividend decision was investigated by Holder et al. (1998), Amidu et al. (2006), 
Ling et al. (2008) and Mehta (2012) They concluded that beta has a negative association with dividend payout. 
Jensen et al. (1992) found that greater systematic risk increased the uncertainty of expected future earnings. 
Therefore, firms force to pay fewer dividends due to increase of uncertainty earnings. Moh'd et al. (1995) also 
indicated an inverse relationship between the Dividend payout and firm’s risk. They revealed that firms with 
volatility earnings paid lower dividends, in an attempt to keep the dividend payout stable and to avoid the high 
cost of external financing. On the contrary, Mollah (2002) resulted that firms listed on the Dhaka Stock 
Exchange paid a large dividend, although the beta for their stock was high. He argued that in an emerging stock 
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exchange, the dividend might not be the most appropriate tool to convey correct information about transaction 
costs to the market. Also Al Shabibi et al. (2011) who studied a sample consists of 90 nonfinancial firms in UK. 
They found that firm risk has a positive significant impact on the dividend payout.  
2.2.6 Market to Book Value  
Omran et al. (2004) who studied sample of 49 Egyptian firms for period 1999-2000, they indicated that market-
to-book ratio is a significant factor that influence dividend payout ratio in Egyptian firms. Besides that, more 
investment opportunities there are fewer dividend payouts due to finance the new investment. Also Amidu et al. 
(2006) found a negative relationship between market-to-book ratio and dividend payout ratios. In contrast, Gill et 
al. (2010), Aivazian (2003) found that there is highly significant positive association between market to book 
value and dividend payout.  
 
3 Hypotheses 
This section provides the hypothesized relationship between dividend payout ratio (DPR) as dependent variable 
with the chosen factors namely, profitability, size, growth opportunities, free cash flow, business risk and market 
to book value.  
H1: The dividend payout ratio is positively associated with return on assets. 
H2: The dividend payout ratio is positively associated with return on equity. 
H3: The dividend payout ratio is positively associated with earning per share.  
H4: The dividend payout ratio is positively associated with firm size. 
H5: The dividend payout ratio is positively/negatively associated with growth opportunities. 
H6: The dividend payout ratio is positively associated with free cash flow. 
H7: The dividend payout ratio is negatively associated with Beta. 
H8: The dividend payout ratio is negatively/positively associated with market to book value. 
 
4 Research Method 
The multiple regression method is used to examine the relationship between the Dividend payout ratio and 
profitability, size, growth opportunities, free cash flow (FCF), business risk “beta”, earning per share (EPS), 
market to book value (MBV) of the companies in the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange. Data is analyzed with the 
use of SPSS version11.5 software.  
The result of the regression analysis is an equation that represents the best prediction of a dependent variable 
from several independent variables. 
 
The regression equation that is estimated is as follows:  
DPR = α0 + β1 FCF + β2 ROE + β 3 ROA +β4 EPS + β5 MBV + β6 GrowthAssets + β7     MarketCap+ β8 Beta 
+ ε 
 
Where,  
DPR: represents Dividend payout ratio which defines as Dividend/ (retained earnings+ net income). 
FCF: Free cash flow is a measure of how much cash a company has for ongoing activities and growth after 
paying its bills. (Al-Kuwar, 2009). It’s derived from DataStream.  
ROE: is Return on equity that is measured by net income divided by Shareholder's equity does not include 
preferred shares. It’s derived from DataStream and it’s a proxy for profitability.  
ROA:  is Return on assets that is measured by net income divided by total assets of the company. It’s derived 
from DataStream and it’s a proxy for profitability. 
EPS: Earning per share, it’s the portion of a company's profit allocated to each outstanding share of common 
stock. It’s derived from DataStream and it’s a proxy for profitability. 
MBV: Market-to-book ratio reflects the market view of the value of equity in comparison to what shareholders 
have contributed to the firm since the day it was established. (Gill et al. 2010). It’s derived from DataStream.  
GrowthAssets: is Growth Assets is proxy for growth opportunities, it’s measured by (Total assets t- Total assets 
t-1)/ Total assets t-1. 
 MarketCap: is Market capitalization which is proxy for firm size, it’s calculated by multiplying a company's 
shares outstanding by the current market price of one share. 
Beta: is the Business risk   
ε: Error term 
 
5 Scope of the research 
The study covers data on financial performances of 284 listed firms in Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange of Bursa 
Malaysia in seven sectors viz., Consumer Product, Industrial Products, Construction, Finance, Technology, 
Properties and Communication sector for which comprehensive data was available for the period 2002 to 2011.  
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The firms which do not have complete data for the period under reference were excluded from the study; size of 
the sample and the period of the study were therefore conditioned by the availability of data and hence it is a 
purposive sample. The study is focused on profitability, size, growth opportunities, free cash flow, market to 
book value and business risk in Malaysian firms and to assess how they related to dividend payout ratio on a 
temporal basis.  
 
6 Sample  
The study covers data on financial performances of 284 listed firms in Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange of Bursa 
Malaysia in seven sectors viz., Consumer Product, Industrial Products, Construction, Finance, Technology, 
Properties and Communication sector for which comprehensive data was available for the period 2002 to 2011.  
The firms which do not have complete data for the period under reference were excluded from the study; size of 
the sample and the period of the study were therefore conditioned by the availability of data and hence it is a 
purposive sample.  
 
7 Source of Data 
The data used in this study is drawn from Thomson DataStream, which is provided from the library of University 
Utara Malaysia; the data on financial performances of 284 companies listed in the Main Board of the Kuala 
Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) were drawn form DataStream. This data includes companies from seven sectors 
namely Consumer Products, Industrial Products, Construction, Finance, Technology, Properties and 
Telecommunication. All data used in the study is therefore secondary data but provided all the needed 
information required by the researcher in addressing the research problem under reference (Sekaran, 2003). 
The table 1 profiles the secondary data used for the purpose of analysis of the study. 
Table 1: The observations of the study. 
Sector name 
Total number of Listed 
firms 
Total number of firms for 
which required data 
were available 
% of available firms 
Consumer Products 86 62 72% 
Industrial Products 122 62 50.8% 
Construction 107 54 50.4% 
Finance 18 10 55.5% 
Technology 87 31 35.6% 
Properties 94 62 65.9% 
Telecommunication 11 3 27.2% 
 
8 The Results of Hypotheses Testing 
8.1 Correlations Analysis 
Table 2 shows the correlation analysis at the aggregate level of All sectors. It is found that FCF is significantly 
and positively correlate (corr =.110 at .01 level) with DPR. Similarly, ROE, ROA EPS and Market to Book 
Value has significant positive correlation with DPR (corr =.279, corr =.141, corr =.271 and corr =.162 
respectively all at .01 level). Similarly Market capitalization shows significant and positive correlation with DPR 
(corr =.163 at .01 level). While Beta is negatively correlated (corr = -.094 at .o1 level) and the correlations 
between growth assets and DPR is positive .008 but it not at a significant level. 
Table 3 shows the findings of the analysis for Construction sector.  It can be seen that unlike the 
profile at the aggregate level, FCF, Beta and ROE are not correlated to DPR in the Construction sector but ROA, 
EPS, Market to Book Value and Market Capitalization of this sector are significantly correlated to DPR., the 
correlation is highest with EPS (corr=.442 at .01 level) and Market Capitalization (corr=.318 at .01level).  
The correlation between growth assets and DPR is positive and significant but less stronger than all sectors 
analysis. Table 4 reflects the result of the analysis for Industrial Product sector. It is found that only three 
variables viz., ROE, Market to Book Value and Beta have significant correlation with DPR of this sector; the 
correlation of ROE is significantly positive value of .382 and for Market to book value of 0.96. While the 
correlation of Beta is significantly negative value of -.108 and EPS is weak negative relationship. And The 
others variables have weak positive correlation with DPR. 
Table 5 shows the findings for the Consumer Products sector. FCF has strong correlation with DPR 
(corr = .147 at .01level). Furthermore, the correlation between ROA, EPS and Market to Book value are also 
positive and significant ( corr = .258, .114 and .321 and  respectively at .01 level. On the other hand the 
correlation between beta and DPR is negative and significant while growth assets is negative and weak -.007, 
likewise ROE is correlated weakly and not significant. 
Table 6 indicates the findings of Properties sector. FCF, EPS and Market to book value aren’t 
correlated with DPS while they were correlated positively in the all sectors analysis. However, the correlation 
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between ROE and ROA with DPR is positive and significant (corr = .189 and .175 respectively at .01 level). 
Likewise the correlations between market capitalization is positive and strong .204 with DPR. The correlations 
between growth assets and DPR is positive and significant .089 but less stronger than all sector analysis. Beta is 
found to be correlated negatively and more strongly with DPR (corr= -.264 at.01 level). 
Table 7 shows the findings of Technology sector. Unlike the findings at the aggregate level, ROE, 
Growth assets and Beta aren’t correlated with DPR in the case of Technology sector. (But they are correlated 
positively in the all sectors analysis.). However, FCF and Market Capitalization are significantly correlated 
(corr=.257 and .149 at .01 level) with DPR. Other variables like EPS, Market to Book Value and Growth of 
Assets etc. are positively correlated to DPR except Beta is negative but all not significant at .01 level  
Table 8 presents the findings in Finance sector. It is interesting to note that unlike the analysis at All 
Sector level, FCF, ROE, ROA, Market to book value, growth assets and Beta aren’t correlated significantly with 
DPR. However, the correlation between EPS and Market Capitalization are positive and significant (corr=.556 
and .513 respectively at .011 level) with DPR. 
Table 9 shows the findings of Telecommunication sector. Four variables viz., FCF, ROA, Market to 
Book Value and Market Capitalization are found to be significantly and positively correlated  
(corr=.697, .723, .131 and .621 respectively at .01 level) with DPR but Beta is correlated negatively and 
significantly (corr= -.714). Whereas, the correlation of ROE and Growth assets with DPR in this sector are not 
significant and weak.  
 
9 Multiple Linear Regression Analysis  
The present section will elucidate the analysis and relationships, through the multiple regression technique, 
between dividend payout ratio (DPR) as dependent variable and independent variables comprising of free cash 
flow, return on equity, return on assets, earning per share, market to book value, growth assets, market 
capitalization and beta for 9 years from 2003-2011 at All Sectors level and seven sectors at individual level. The 
output of multiple regressions at All Sector level is shown in tables 10. 
Table 10: Summary of the Regressions Model 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
 1 .406a .165 .162 23.0224417 
a. Predictor Variables: (Constant), Beta, Growth assets, MBV, ROE, EPS, ROA, Market Cap., and FCF. 
b - Dependent Variable: DPR. 
R-sq indicates that the influence of independent variables on the dependent variables. It is found that the 
independent variables determine 16.5% of the DPR i.e., more than 16% of the relationship with DPR can be 
determined by the eight independent variables.  
 Table 11: ANOVAb 
Model Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 266755.204 8 33344.400 62.910 .000a 
Residual 1349993.593 2547 530.033   
Total 1616748.796 2556    
Table 11, the ANOVA table, indicates that the F-value is 62.910 at significance of 0.000, which means 
that 16.5% of the variance of DPR for the listed Malaysian companies had been significantly explained by the 
eight independent variables. 
Table 12: The Coefficients of Multiple Regression Analysis 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 
(Constant) 19.730 .858  23.008 .000   
FCF -2.867E-6 .000 -.048 -1.589 .112 .357 2.802 
ROE .237 .017 .250 13.743 .000 .988 1.012 
ROA .175 .030 .107 5.735 .000 .945 1.059 
EPS .214 .021 .183 9.938 .000 .969 1.032 
MBV 1.430 .320 .086 4.470 .000 .895 1.118 
Growth assets .330 .594 .011 .556 .578 .792 1.262 
Market Cap. 1.053E-6 .000 .135 4.603 .000 .379 2.639 
Beta -3.630 .644 -.104 -5.635 .000 .971 1.030 
a. Dependent Variable: DPR. 
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The coefficients of the  multiple regression analysis  as presented in Table 12 reflects that first, six 
variables namely, return on equity (ROE), return on assets (ROA), earning per share (EPS), market to book value 
(MBV), market capitalization and Beta are significant at the 5% confidence level. Second, the other two 
variables namely, free cash flow (FCF) and growth assets show insignificant relationship.  
By analyzing Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) in ROE model, we can find that all independent 
variables has tolerance value higher than 0.1. Moreover, for all the variables included in the study have VIF 
value less than 10. This finding suggests that multi-collinearity hasn’t been a problem in the study. 
 
10 Conclusion 
Present study was aimed at identifying determinant variables of the dividend payout ratio of the listed Malaysian 
companies. The findings of the empirical analysis carried out during the study using various tools & techniques, 
the determinant variables of DPR at the All Sector level (pooled data) is presented in this section. The summary 
table of significant variables (Table 13) broadly reflects the outcome of the correlation analysis carried-out 
during the study. Table 13 reflects that Market capitalization; Beta, ROA and ROE are the common variables 
which have influence on DPR across various sectors except in technology sector where it is found that the 
variable Market capitalization is not significantly associated with DPR. Similarly, ROA, which is significant 
determinant variable of DPR in four sectors like Construction, Consumer Products, Properties and 
Telecommunication Sector, it has no influence on the dividend payout ratio of the companies in the Industrial, 
Technology and Finance sectors. 
Table 13: Summary of correlations analysis 
Sectors FCF ROE ROA EPS M to B Growth assets Market capitalization Beta 
All sectors √ √ √ √ √  √ √ 
Construction   √ √ √ √ √  
Industrial products  √     √ √ 
Consumer products √ √ √ √ √  √ √ 
Properties  √ √   √ √ √ 
Technology √ √       
Finance    √   √  
Telecommunication √  √  √  √ √ 
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Appendix 
Table 2: Correlations for pooling data  
 DPR. FCF ROE ROA EPS MBV Growth assetsMarket Cap.Beta 
DPR. Pearson Correlation 1 .110** .279** .141** .217** .162** .008 .163** .482** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .674 .000 .000 
N 2556 2556 2556 2556 2556 2556 2556 2556 2556 
FCF Pearson Correlation .110** 1 .027 .061** .120** .157** .304** .739** .039* 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  .179 .002 .000 .000 .000 .000 .047 
N 2556 2556 2556 2556 2556 2556 2556 2556 2556 
ROE Pearson Correlation .279** .027 1 .070** .068** .025 .017 .046* .121** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .179  .000 .001 .207 .397 .020 .000 
N 2556 2556 2556 2556 2556 2556 2556 2556 2556 
ROA Pearson Correlation .141** .061** .070**1 .028 .158** .085** .090** .076** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .002 .000  .160 .000 .000 .000 .000 
N 2556 2556 2556 2556 2556 2556 2556 2556 2556 
EPS Pearson Correlation .217** .120** .068** .028 1 .109** -.006 .093** .154** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .001 .160  .000 .758 .000 .000 
N 2556 2556 2556 2556 2556 2556 2556 2556 2556 
MBV Pearson Correlation .162** .157** .025 .158** .109**1 .008 .266** -.054**
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .207 .000 .000  .678 .000 .007 
N 2556 2556 2556 2556 2556 2556 2556 2556 2556 
Growth assetsPearson Correlation .008 .304** .017 .085**-.006 .008 1 .009 .000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .674 .000 .397 .000 .758 .678  .640 .998 
N 2556 2556 2556 2556 2556 2556 2556 2556 2556 
Market Cap. Pearson Correlation .163** .739** .046* .090** .093** .266** .009 1 .063** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .020 .000 .000 .000 .640  .002 
N 2556 2556 2556 2556 2556 2556 2556 2556 2556 
Beta Pearson Correlation        -.094**  
-.061**
 
-.014 
 
.120**
 
.020 
 
-.051*
 
.023 
 
-.020 
 
1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .002 .491 .000 .310 .011 .239 .303  
N 2556 2556 2556 2556 2556 2556 2556 2556 2556 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 3: Correlations for construction sector 
 DPR. FCF ROE ROA EPS MBV Growth assetsMarket Cap.Beta 
DPR. Pearson Correlation 1 .032 .019 .256** .442** .131** .095* .318** .044 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .485 .683 .000 .000 .004 .036 .000 .332 
N 486 486 486 486 486 486 486 486 486 
FCF Pearson Correlation .032 1 -.043 .040 .014 .024 .005 .163** .013 
Sig. (2-tailed) .485  .349 .376 .765 .595 .908 .000 .771 
N 486 486 486 486 486 486 486 486 486 
ROE Pearson Correlation .019 -.043 1 -.105* .109* .027 .033 -.084 -.010 
Sig. (2-tailed) .683 .349  .020 .016 .556 .474 .066 .830 
N 486 486 486 486 486 486 486 486 486 
ROA Pearson Correlation .256** .040 -.105*1 .069 .071 .050 .131** .120**
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .376 .020  .127 .121 .269 .004 .008 
N 486 486 486 486 486 486 486 486 486 
EPS Pearson Correlation .442** .014 .109* .069 1 .065 .051 .102* -.014 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .765 .016 .127  .155 .261 .024 .756 
N 486 486 486 486 486 486 486 486 486 
MBV Pearson Correlation .131** .024 .027 .071 .065 1 .001 .383** .199**
Sig. (2-tailed) .004 .595 .556 .121 .155  .983 .000 .000 
N 486 486 486 486 486 486 486 486 486 
Growth assetsPearson Correlation .095* .005 .033 .050 .051 .001 1 .048 .017 
Sig. (2-tailed) .036 .908 .474 .269 .261 .983  .286 .713 
N 486 486 486 486 486 486 486 486 486 
Market Cap. Pearson Correlation .318** .163**-.084 .131** .102* .383** .048 1 .236**
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .066 .004 .024 .000 .286  .000 
N 486 486 486 486 486 486 486 486 486 
Beta Pearson Correlation .044 .013 -.010 .120** -.014 .199** .017 .236** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .332 .771 .830 .008 .756 .000 .713 .000  
N 486 486 486 486 486 486 486 486 486 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 4: Correlations for industrial Products sector 
 DPR FCF ROE ROA EPS M to BGrowth assetsMarket Capitali Beta 
DPR. Pearson Correlation 1 .032 .019 .256** .442** .131** .095* .318** .044 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .485 .683 .000 .000 .004 .036 .000 .332 
N 486 486 486 486 486 486 486 486 486 
FCF Pearson Correlation .032 1 -.043 .040 .014 .024 .005 .163** .013 
Sig. (2-tailed) .485  .349 .376 .765 .595 .908 .000 .771 
N 486 486 486 486 486 486 486 486 486 
ROE Pearson Correlation .019 -.043 1 -.105* .109* .027 .033 -.084 -.010 
Sig. (2-tailed) .683 .349  .020 .016 .556 .474 .066 .830 
N 486 486 486 486 486 486 486 486 486 
ROA Pearson Correlation .256** .040 -.105*1 .069 .071 .050 .131** .120**
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .376 .020  .127 .121 .269 .004 .008 
N 486 486 486 486 486 486 486 486 486 
EPS Pearson Correlation .442** .014 .109* .069 1 .065 .051 .102* -.014 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .765 .016 .127  .155 .261 .024 .756 
N 486 486 486 486 486 486 486 486 486 
M BV Pearson Correlation .131** .024 .027 .071 .065 1 .001 .383** .199**
Sig. (2-tailed) .004 .595 .556 .121 .155  .983 .000 .000 
N 486 486 486 486 486 486 486 486 486 
Growth assetsPearson Correlation .095* .005 .033 .050 .051 .001 1 .048 .017 
Sig. (2-tailed) .036 .908 .474 .269 .261 .983  .286 .713 
N 486 486 486 486 486 486 486 486 486 
Market Cap. Pearson Correlation .318** .163**-.084 .131** .102* .383** .048 1 .236**
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .066 .004 .024 .000 .286  .000 
N 486 486 486 486 486 486 486 486 486 
Beta Pearson Correlation .044 .013 -.010 .120** -.014 .199** .017 .236** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .332 .771 .830 .008 .756 .000 .713 .000  
N 486 486 486 486 486 486 486 486 486 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 5: Correlations for consumer sector 
 DPR. FCF ROE ROA EPS MBV Growth assetsMarket Cap.Beta 
DPR. Pearson Correlation 1 .147** .134** .258** .123** .321**-.007 .154** -.179**
Sig. (2-tailed)  .001 .001 .000 .004 .000 .867 .000 .000 
N 558 558 558 558 558 558 558 558 558 
FCF Pearson Correlation .147** 1 -.021 .225** .015 .352** .056 .826** .078 
Sig. (2-tailed) .001  .616 .000 .727 .000 .187 .000 .065 
N 558 558 558 558 558 558 558 558 558 
ROE Pearson Correlation .134** -.021 1 .005 -.056 .045 -.072 -.004 -.081 
Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .616  .912 .186 .291 .090 .934 .057 
N 558 558 558 558 558 558 558 558 558 
ROA Pearson Correlation .258** .225** .005 1 .006 .274** .310** .240** -.060 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .912  .890 .000 .000 .000 .154 
N 558 558 558 558 558 558 558 558 558 
EPS Pearson Correlation .123** .015 -.056 .006 1 .008 .017 .013 .007 
Sig. (2-tailed) .004 .727 .186 .890  .841 .681 .754 .865 
N 558 558 558 558 558 558 558 558 558 
MBV Pearson Correlation .321** .352** .045 .274** .008 1 .027 .374** -.054 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .291 .000 .841  .525 .000 .204 
N 558 558 558 558 558 558 558 558 558 
Growth assetsPearson Correlation -.007 .056 -.072 .310** .017 .027 1 .058 .035 
Sig. (2-tailed) .867 .187 .090 .000 .681 .525  .169 .413 
N 558 558 558 558 558 558 558 558 558 
Market Cap. Pearson Correlation .154** .826**-.004 .240** .013 .374** .058 1 .070 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .934 .000 .754 .000 .169  .096 
N 558 558 558 558 558 558 558 558 558 
Beta Pearson Correlation -.179** .078 -.081 -.060 .007 -.054 .035 .070 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .065 .057 .154 .865 .204 .413 .096  
N 558 558 558 558 558 558 558 558 558 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 6: Correlations for Properties sector 
 DPR. FCF ROE ROA EPS M to BGrowth assetsMarket Capitali Beta 
DPR. Pearson Correlation 1 .071 .189** .175**-.037.065 .089* .204** -.264**
Sig. (2-tailed)  .096 .000 .000 .381 .127 .035 .000 .000 
N 558 558 558 558 558 558 558 558 558 
FCF Pearson Correlation .071 1 .050 .135**-.008.056 -.016 .505** -.028 
Sig. (2-tailed) .096  .241 .001 .855 .187 .702 .000 .511 
N 558 558 558 558 558 558 558 558 558 
ROE Pearson Correlation .189** .050 1 -.025 -.022.007 .042 .036 -.121**
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .241  .554 .599 .871 .326 .399 .004 
N 558 558 558 558 558 558 558 558 558 
ROA Pearson Correlation .175** .135**-.025 1 -.013.045 .159** .140** -.046 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .001 .554  .754 .288 .000 .001 .281 
N 558 558 558 558 558 558 558 558 558 
EPS Pearson Correlation -.037 -.008 -.022 -.013 1 .002 .000 .000 -.066 
Sig. (2-tailed) .381 .855 .599 .754  .971 .995 .991 .120 
N 558 558 558 558 558 558 558 558 558 
MBV Pearson Correlation .065 .056 .007 .045 .002 1 .016 .170** -.042 
Sig. (2-tailed) .127 .187 .871 .288 .971  .704 .000 .321 
N 558 558 558 558 558 558 558 558 558 
Growth assetsPearson Correlation .089* -.016 .042 .159** .000 .016 1 .114** .014 
Sig. (2-tailed) .035 .702 .326 .000 .995 .704  .007 .733 
N 558 558 558 558 558 558 558 558 558 
Market Cap. Pearson Correlation .204** .505** .036 .140** .000 .170** .114** 1 .032 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .399 .001 .991 .000 .007  .449 
N 558 558 558 558 558 558 558 558 558 
Beta Pearson Correlation -.264** -.028 -.121**-.046 -.066-.042 .014 .032 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .511 .004 .281 .120 .321 .733 .449  
N 558 558 558 558 558 558 558 558 558 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 7: Correlations for Technology sector 
 DPR. fcf ROE ROA EPS MBV Growth assetsMarket Cap.Beta 
DPR. Pearson Correlation 1 .161**-.154** .071 .010 .067 .023 .115 -.072 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .007 .010 .239 .866 .269 .700 .055 .229 
N 278 278 278 278 278 278 278 278 278 
FCF Pearson Correlation .161** 1 .028 .079 .295** .120* -.030 .634** -.010 
Sig. (2-tailed) .007  .637 .190 .000 .045 .615 .000 .862 
N 278 279 279 279 279 279 279 279 279 
ROE Pearson Correlation -.154** .028 1 -.013 .051 -.032 -.120* -.023 -.026 
Sig. (2-tailed) .010 .637  .826 .398 .592 .045 .705 .661 
N 278 279 279 279 279 279 279 279 279 
ROA Pearson Correlation .071 .079 -.013 1 .075 .203** .348** .110 .318**
Sig. (2-tailed) .239 .190 .826  .213 .001 .000 .067 .000 
N 278 279 279 279 279 279 279 279 279 
EPS Pearson Correlation .010 .295** .051 .075 1 .102 .011 .306** -.006 
Sig. (2-tailed) .866 .000 .398 .213  .089 .849 .000 .918 
N 278 279 279 279 279 279 279 279 279 
MBV Pearson Correlation .067 .120* -.032 .203** .102 1 .120* .380** .036 
Sig. (2-tailed) .269 .045 .592 .001 .089  .045 .000 .547 
N 278 279 279 279 279 279 279 279 279 
Growth assetsPearson Correlation .023 -.030 -.120* .348** .011 .120* 1 -.003 .087 
Sig. (2-tailed) .700 .615 .045 .000 .849 .045  .954 .148 
N 278 279 279 279 279 279 279 279 279 
Market Cap. Pearson Correlation .115 .634**-.023 .110 .306** .380**-.003 1 .194**
Sig. (2-tailed) .055 .000 .705 .067 .000 .000 .954  .001 
N 278 279 279 279 279 279 279 279 279 
Beta Pearson Correlation -.072 -.010 -.026 .318**-.006 .036 .087 .194** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .229 .862 .661 .000 .918 .547 .148 .001  
N 278 279 279 279 279 279 279 279 279 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 8: Correlations For Finance sector 
 DPR. FCF ROE ROA EPS M to BGrowth assetsMarket Cap.Beta 
DPR. Pearson Correlation 1 .161**-.154** .071 .010 .067 .023 .115 -.072 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .007 .010 .239 .866 .269 .700 .055 .229 
N 278 278 278 278 278 278 278 278 278 
 
FCF 
Pearson Correlation .161** 1 .028 .079 .295** .120* -.030 .634** -.010 
Sig. (2-tailed) .007  .637 .190 .000 .045 .615 .000 .862 
N 278 279 279 279 279 279 279 279 279 
ROE Pearson Correlation -.154** .028 1 -.013 .051 -.032 -.120* -.023 -.026 
Sig. (2-tailed) .010 .637  .826 .398 .592 .045 .705 .661 
N 278 279 279 279 279 279 279 279 279 
ROA Pearson Correlation .071 .079 -.013 1 .075 .203** .348** .110 .318**
Sig. (2-tailed) .239 .190 .826  .213 .001 .000 .067 .000 
N 278 279 279 279 279 279 279 279 279 
EPS Pearson Correlation .010 .295** .051 .075 1 .102 .011 .306** -.006 
Sig. (2-tailed) .866 .000 .398 .213  .089 .849 .000 .918 
N 278 279 279 279 279 279 279 279 279 
MBV Pearson Correlation .067 .120* -.032 .203** .102 1 .120* .380** .036 
Sig. (2-tailed) .269 .045 .592 .001 .089  .045 .000 .547 
N 278 279 279 279 279 279 279 279 279 
Growth assetsPearson Correlation .023 -.030 -.120* .348** .011 .120* 1 -.003 .087 
Sig. (2-tailed) .700 .615 .045 .000 .849 .045  .954 .148 
N 278 279 279 279 279 279 279 279 279 
Market Cap. Pearson Correlation .115 .634**-.023 .110 .306** .380** -.003 1 .194**
Sig. (2-tailed) .055 .000 .705 .067 .000 .000 .954  .001 
N 278 279 279 279 279 279 279 279 279 
Beta Pearson Correlation -.072 -.010 -.026 .318**-.006 .036 .087 .194** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .229 .862 .661 .000 .918 .547 .148 .001  
N 278 279 279 279 279 279 279 279 279 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 9: Correlations for Telecommunication Sector 
 DPR. FCF ROE ROA EPS MBV Growth assetsMarket Cap.Beta 
DPR. Pearson Correlation 1 .161**-.154** .071 .010 .067 .023 .115 -.072 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .007 .010 .239 .866 .269 .700 .055 .229 
N 278 278 278 278 278 278 278 278 278 
FCF Pearson Correlation .161** 1 .028 .079 .295** .120* -.030 .634** -.010 
Sig. (2-tailed) .007  .637 .190 .000 .045 .615 .000 .862 
N 278 279 279 279 279 279 279 279 279 
ROE Pearson Correlation -.154** .028 1 -.013 .051 -.032 -.120* -.023 -.026 
Sig. (2-tailed) .010 .637  .826 .398 .592 .045 .705 .661 
N 278 279 279 279 279 279 279 279 279 
ROA Pearson Correlation .071 .079 -.013 1 .075 .203** .348** .110 .318**
Sig. (2-tailed) .239 .190 .826  .213 .001 .000 .067 .000 
N 278 279 279 279 279 279 279 279 279 
EPS Pearson Correlation .010 .295** .051 .075 1 .102 .011 .306** -.006 
Sig. (2-tailed) .866 .000 .398 .213  .089 .849 .000 .918 
N 278 279 279 279 279 279 279 279 279 
MBV Pearson Correlation .067 .120* -.032 .203** .102 1 .120* .380** .036 
Sig. (2-tailed) .269 .045 .592 .001 .089  .045 .000 .547 
N 278 279 279 279 279 279 279 279 279 
Growth assetsPearson Correlation .023 -.030 -.120* .348** .011 .120* 1 -.003 .087 
Sig. (2-tailed) .700 .615 .045 .000 .849 .045  .954 .148 
N 278 279 279 279 279 279 279 279 279 
Market Cap. Pearson Correlation .115 .634**-.023 .110 .306** .380**-.003 1 .194**
Sig. (2-tailed) .055 .000 .705 .067 .000 .000 .954  .001 
N 278 279 279 279 279 279 279 279 279 
Beta Pearson Correlation -.072 -.010 -.026 .318**-.006 .036 .087 .194** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .229 .862 .661 .000 .918 .547 .148 .001  
N 278 279 279 279 279 279 279 279 279 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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